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distinction between imperfect self
defense and the heat of passion defenses
is that the defendant acted the way he
did due to a "fear of life" rather than a
heat of passion. The judicial recognition
of the imperfect self defense allows the
courts to avoid the choice between
murder and complete exonerations in
non-heat of passion cases where the
defendant's conduct warranted neither a
murder conviction nor an acquittal.
This defense requires the defendant to
bear some responsibility for the
homicide, even though he may have
lacked the requisite mens rea for
murder.
The court reviewed the history of the
imperfect self defense doctrine and
found that the case law revealed three
variations of the doctrine. Some courts
have applied the doctrine where the
homicide at issue falls within the perfect
self defense doctrine, except for the fault
of the defendant in provoking or
initiating the difficulty at the non-deadly
force level. Other courts have applied
the doctrine where the defendant
committed a homicide because of an
honest but unreasonable belief that he
was about to suffer death or serious
bodily harm. Still, other courts have
recognized the doctrine when the
defendant uses unreasonable force in
defending himself and as a result, killed
his opponent.
Prior to the Faulkner decision, the
court of special appeals had dealt with
six imperfect defense cases which
gradually expanded the application of
this mitigating defense to the criminal
defenses of imperfect defense of others,
Shuck v. State, 29 Md. App. 33, 349
A2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md.
733 (1976) imperfect defense of duress,
Wentworth v. State, 29 Md. App. 110,
349 A.2d 421 (1975), cert. denied, 278
Md. 735 (1976), and imperfect defense
of habitation, Law v. State, 29 Md. App.
457,349 A2d 295 (1975), cert. denied,
278 Md. 729 (1976).
Due to the Faulkner decision, the
defendant is now presented with a wide
range of mitigating defenses that serve to
reduce a conviction of murder to
manslaughter. As the Court stated, "A
defendant who commits a homicide
while honestly, though unreasonably,
believing that he is threatened with
death or serious bodily harm, does not
act with malice. Absent malice, he
cannot be convicted of murder.
Nevertheless, because the killing was
committed without justification or
excuse, the defendant is not entitled to
full exoreration. " Yet, according to the
court the defendant is entitled to a
10-Tht' La\\' Forllm SjJrillg, 1985

proper instruction to show the
defendant's subjective (honest) belief
that the use of force was necessary to
prevent imminent death or serious
bodily harm. Once the defendant has
established the existence of that belief,

the jury must reject the reasonableness
of that belief as well as the existence of
that belief itself to find the defendant
guilty of murder.
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by Regan J.R. Smith

DWI Rights
Chemical Sobriety Test
by Jennifer Hammond
he Maryland Court of Appeals
recently considered the issue of
whether a person who is apprehended for driving while intoxicated has
a constitutional right to consult counsel
before deciding whether to submit to a
chemical sobriety test. In Sites v. State,
300 Md. 701,481 A2d 192 (1984), the
court of appeals held that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth

T

Amendment of the United States
Constitution, as well as Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights,
requires that a person under detention
as a drunk driving suspect must, if the
suspect so requests, be permitted a
reasonable opportunity to communicate
with counsel before submitting to a
chemical sobriety test, as long as the

attempted communication will not
substantially interfere with the timely
administration of the testing process.
The laws concerning submission to a
sobriety test in Maryland are fairly clearcut. For instance, a chemical sobriety
test must be administered within two
hours "after the person accused is
apprehended." Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. § 10-303 (1984). A person
may not be compelled to submit to such
a test and any refusal is not admissible at
a trial since no inference or presumption
concerning guilt arises as a result of
refusal to submit to the test. Md. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-309 (1984).
Additionally, § 16-205.l(a) of the
Transportation Article - the "implied
consent" statute - explicitly states that
any person who operates a motor
vehicle in Maryland is deemed to have
consented to take a chemical test to
determine alcohol content if that person
is apprehended on suspicion of drunk
driving. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16205.l(b) (1984).
Maryland driver who declines to take
the chemical sobriety test "shall" have
his license suspended for not less than
60 days or more than 6 months for a first
offense. Md. Transp. Code Ann. §16205.l(b) (1984).
As previously stated, the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Sites based its
decision on the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court,
citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), stated that, while the exact
contours of the due process clause are
not definable with precision, the
constitutional right of due process

assures that convICtions cannot be
brought about in criminal cases by
methods which offend a sense of justice.
According to the Sites court, Maryland's
implied consent statute, by allowing a
suspect to refuse chemical testing,
deliberately gives the licensed driver a
choice between two different potential
sanctions each of which affect vitally
important interests. That is, a driver
may submit to the test and any adverse
results may be used against that driver in
a criminal trial for drunk driving. On the
other hand, if the driver refuses to
submit to the chemcial sobriety test then
that individual's drivers license "shall"
be suspended for not less than 60 days
nor more than 6 months for first
offense. Md. Transp. Code Ann. § 1620S.1(b) (1984). In addition, the court
noted that "revocation of a driver's
license may burden the ordinary driver
as much or more than the traditional
criminal sanctions of fine or
imprisonment." 300 Md. at 717, 481
A.2d at 199-200. Moreover, the
continued possession of a driver's
license may become essential to earning
a livelihood and therefore may be an
entitlement which cannot be taken
without the due process mandated by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Based on
the foregoing, the court ruled that "to
unreasonably deny a requested right of
access to counsel to a drunk driving

suspect offends a sense of justice which
impairs the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding." 300 Md. at 717,481 A.2d
at 200.
Therefore, the court in Sites held that
if a person under detention for drunk
driving requests to telephone an
attorney for advice on whether to take a
sobriety test the police must honor that
request. The holding of the court is not
without limits, however. That is, the
court held that "a person under
detention for drunk driving must, on
request, be permitted a reasonable
opportunity to communicate with
counsel before submitting to a chemical
sobriety test, as long as such attempted
communication will not substantially
interfere with the timely and efficacious
administration of the testing process." 300
Md. at 717-18, 481 A.2d at 200.
(emphasis added). The court noted that
there is no "bright line" rule as to what
constitutes a reasonable delay (although
Md. Cts. &Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10303 (1984) mandates that in no event
may the test be administered later than
two hours after the driver's
apprehension). According to the court,
the statutory purpose of the drunk
driving laws is to obtain the best
evidence of blood alcohol content as
may be practicable under the
circumstances, and it is common
knowledge that such blood alcohol

SAFECO CONTINUES TO SERVE YOU
We are a full service title organization
working with attorneys. lending institutions. real estate firms and individuals.
Our expert team of title personnel and
our efficient and experienced agents are
always available for all your title
requirements.

content dissipates with the passage of
time. Thus, the court held that if counsel
cannot be contacted within a reasonable
time, an individual may be required to
make a decision regarding testing
without the advice of counsel. The Sites
court further emphasized that under no
circumstances may the right to
communicate with counsel be permitted
to delay the test for an unreasonable
time since such a delay would impair the
accuracy of the test and defeat the
purpose of the statute.
The court concluded that the
determination as to whether a drunk
driving suspect who seeks to
communicate with counsel has been
denied his due process right to do so
depends on the circumstances of each
case. If a suspect submits to a chemical
sobriety test after being denied his due
process right to contact an attorney,
then, according to the Sites court, the
only effective sanction is to suppress the
results of the test where such results ar~
adverse to the defendant. Nonetheless,
the court warned that a reviewing court
should afford great deference to the
determination of the police authorities
that it was reasonably necessary for the
timely administration of the chemical
sobriety test to deny the requested right
of access to counsel.
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